Technological diversification by Koren, Miklós & Tenreyro, Silvana
WORKING PAPER SERIES




ECB-CFS RESEARCH NETWORK ON
CAPITAL MARKETS AND FINANCIAL
INTEGRATION IN EUROPE
by Miklós Koren In 2005 all ECB 
publications 
will feature 




NO. 551 / NOVEMBER 2005
This paper can be downloaded without charge from 
http://www.ecb.int or from the Social Science Research Network 








1   We thank John Campbell,Francesco Caselli,Elhanan Helpman,Nobuhiro Kiyotaki,Borja Larrain,Marc Melitz,Esteban Rossi-
Hansberg,Ádám Szeidl,Ákos Valentinyi,and seminar participants at Harvard,the Central European University,the Hungarian
Academy of Sciences,the Boston Fed,and the European Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society for comments.Parts of
this paper were written while Koren was visiting the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston and the Institute of Economics in
Budapest,whose hospitality he gratefully acknowledges.Koren thanks the Lamfalussy Fellowship Program sponsored by the
European Central Bank for financial support.Any views expressed are only those of the authors and do not necessarily
represent the views of the ECB,the Eurosystem,the Federal Reserve Bank of New York,or the Federal Reserve System.
2   Federal Reserve Bank of New York,International Research Function,email:miklos.koren@ny.frb.org
3   Department of Economics,London School of Economics,email:s.tenreyro@lse.ac.uk
ECB-CFS RESEARCH NETWORK ON
CAPITAL MARKETS AND FINANCIAL
INTEGRATION IN EUROPE© European Central Bank, 2005
Address
Kaiserstrasse 29
60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Postal address
Postfach 16 03 19
60066 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Telephone




+49 69 1344 6000
Telex
411 144 ecb d
All rights reserved.
Any reproduction, publication and
reprint in the form of a different
publication, whether printed or
produced electronically, in whole or in
part, is permitted only with the explicit
written authorisation of the ECB or the
author(s).
The views expressed in this paper do not
necessarily reflect those of the European
Central Bank.
The statement of purpose for the ECB
Working Paper Series is available from
the ECB website, http://www.ecb.int.
ISSN 1561-0810 (print)
ISSN 1725-2806 (online)
ECB-CFS Research Network on
“Capital Markets and Financial Integration in Europe”
Financial Integration in Europe”. The Network aims at stimulating top-level and policy-relevant research,
significantly contributing to the understanding of the current and future structure and integration of the financial
Working Paper Series is issuing a selection of papers from the Network. This selection is covering the priority
It also covers papers addressing the impact of the euro on financing structures and the cost of capital.
The Network brings together researchers from academia and from policy institutions. It has been guided by a
Steering Committee composed of Franklin Allen (University of Pennsylvania), Giancarlo Corsetti (European
(ECB), Jan Pieter Krahnen (Center for Financial Studies) and Axel Weber (CFS). Mario Roberto Billi, Bernd
its work. Jutta Heeg (CFS) and Sabine Wiedemann (ECB) provided administrative assistance in collaboration with
staff of National Central Banks acting as hosts of Network events. Further information about the Network can be
found at http://www.eu-financial-system.org.
areas “ European bond markets”, “ European securities settlement systems”, “ Bank competition and the geographical
University Institute), Jean-Pierre Danthine (University of Lausanne), Vitor Gaspar (ECB), Philipp Hartmann
scope of banking activities”, “ international portfolio choices and asset market linkages” and “ start-up financing”.
This paper is part of the research conducted under the ECB-CFS Research Network on “ Capital Markets and
system in Europe and its international linkages with the United States and Japan. After two years of work, the ECB
Kaltenhä user (both CFS), Simone Manganelli and Cyril Monnet (both ECB) supported the Steering Committee in3
ECB






2 A model of technological diversification 10
2.1 A static model of technological
diversification, productivity,
and volatility 10
2.2 The dynamic model with endogenous




2.3 Extension to multiple sectors 21
3 Productivity, volatility, and technological




A An example with fixed-coefficients
technology 35
B A two-sector model of technological
diversification 36
B.1 The closed economy 39
B.2 A small open economy 41
C Data appendix 42
Data references 43
Tables and figures 45
European Central Bank working paper series 57Abstract
Why is GDP so much more volatile in poor countries than in rich ones? To
answer this question, we propose a theory of technological diversiﬁcation. Pro-
duction makes use of diﬀerent input varieties, which are subject to imperfectly
correlated shocks. As in endogenous growth models, technological progress in-
creases the number of varieties, raising average productivity. In our model, the
expansion in the number of varieties provides diversiﬁcation beneﬁts against
variety-speciﬁc shocks and it hence lowers the volatility of output. Technological
complexity evolves endogenously in response to proﬁt incentives. Complexity
(and hence output stability) is positively related with the development of the
country, the comparative advantage of the sector, and the sector’s skill and tech-
nology intensity. Using sector-level data for a broad sample of countries, we pro-
vide extensive empirical evidence conﬁrming the cross-country and cross-sectoral
predictions of the model.
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JEL-codes: O11, O14, O41, E32 Non-technical summary 
 
 Why is GDP so much more volatile in poor countries than in rich ones? To answer this 
question, the paper develops an endogenous growth model of technological 
diversification. The key idea of the model is that firms using a larger variety of inputs can 
mitigate the impact of shocks affecting the productivity of individual inputs. This takes 
place through two channels. First, with a larger variety of inputs, each individual input 
matters less in production, and productivity becomes less volatile by the law of large 
numbers. Second, whenever a shock hits a particular input, firms can adjust the use of the 
other inputs to partially offset the shock. This second channel operates even if production 
exhibits an extreme form of complementarity. Both channels make the productivity of 
firms using more sophisticated technologies less volatile. 
 
The paper next analyzes the questions of what determines technological diversification 
and why poorer countries specialize in less sophisticated sectors. The model is extended 
to allow for international mobility of goods and for cross-country differences in 
endowments. Much as in models of endogenous growth and directed technical change, 
the technological complexity of a sector in a given country evolves endogenously in 
response to the incentives of the creators and users of new technologies. In particular, 
more input varieties will be directed towards sectors in which the country has a 
comparative advantage, making them more complex and less volatile. The stage of 
development of the country will also matter, because inventing and/or using the new 
inputs is subject to increasing returns to scale. Countries accumulate new inputs as they 
develop, which brings about a gradual decline in their volatility. The speed of 
development, and hence the speed with which volatility declines, may be influenced by 
the initial level of volatility. If investment risk is harmful for growth, which is the case 
for a range of plausible parameter values in the model, then poor and volatile countries 
will develop slower and will remain highly volatile for long periods. 
 
The model delivers clear-cut predictions about the relationship among technological 
diversification, volatility, and productivity. Using sector-level data for a broad sample of 
countries, the authors provide empirical support for these predictions. First, any given 
sector is less volatile in developed countries. This result holds after controlling for the 
quality of institutions which may facilitate a smoother response to external shocks, such 
as financial development and the flexibility of the labor market. Second, within a given 
country, large, skill intensive sectors using complex technologies are less volatile. This is 
consistent with the model which says that new inputs/technologies will be directed 
towards such sectors, thus reducing volatility. These two mechanisms lead to a decline in 
aggregate volatility as a country develops: The economy experiences less volatility in 
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Economies at early stages of the development process are often shaken by abrupt
changes in growth rates. In his inﬂuential paper, Lucas (1988) brings attention to this
fact, noting that “within the advanced countries, growth rates tend to be very stable
over long periods of time,” whereas within poor countries “there are many examples of
sudden, large changes in growth rates, both up and down.” This negative relationship
between the volatility of growth rates and the level of development is illustrated in
Figure 1, which plots the standard deviation of annual growth rates against the level
of real GDP per capita for a large cross section of countries.
In an attempt to understand the sources of volatility, Koren and Tenreyro (2004)
quantify the contribution of various factors at diﬀerent stages of development, ﬁnding
that the high volatility in poor countries is due to 1) higher levels of sectoral concen-
tration, 2) higher levels of sectoral risk (that is, poor countries not only specialize in
few sectors, but those sectors also tend to bear particularly high risk), and 3) higher
country-speciﬁc macroeconomic risk. A volatility accounting exercise carried out by
these authors indicates that approximately 50 percent of the diﬀerences in volatility
between rich and poor countries can be accounted for by diﬀerences in the sectoral com-
position of the economy (higher concentration and sectoral risk), whereas the other
50 percent is due to country-speciﬁc risk. These characteristics of the development
process, as we later explain, are inconsistent with previous theoretical explanations of
the dynamics of volatility and development. The purpose of this paper is to provide
an alternative theory that is in line with the empirical evidence.
To that end, we develop an endogenous growth model of technological diversiﬁ-
cation. The key idea of the model is that ﬁrms using a larger variety of inputs can
mitigate the impact of shocks aﬀecting the productivity of individual inputs. This takes
place through two channels. First, with a larger variety of inputs, each individual input
matters less in production, and productivity becomes less volatile by the law of large
numbers. Second, whenever a shock hits a particular input, ﬁrms can adjust the use
of the other inputs to partially oﬀset the shock. This second channel operates even if
production exhibits an extreme form of complementarity (as in Kremer (1993)’s O-ring
technology). Both channels make the productivity of ﬁrms using more sophisticated
technologies less volatile.
The idea can be illustrated with an example from agriculture: Growing wheat with
only land and labor as inputs renders the yield vulnerable to idiosyncratic shocks (for
example, weather shocks such as a severe drought). In contrast, using land and labor
together with artiﬁcial irrigation, fertilizers, pesticides, etc., might make wheat-growing
not only more productive but also less risky, because farmers have more options to
6
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displays the volatility of wheat yield (calculated as the standard deviation of percentage
deviations from the country’s average yield) of the 20 biggest wheat producers against
their level of GDP per capita.1 Yield volatility falls sharply with development. This
remains true if we control for diﬀerences in climate across countries, including the
volatility of rainfall and temperature (see Table 1).
The shocks aﬀecting individual inputs or individual production techniques may
come from various sources. Another example of such a shock could be a sudden change
in the price of a major input of a production technique. Countries with a diverse
set of available techniques can cope better with the shock. For instance, the types
of power plants that countries rely on to generate electricity vary with development.
Small and less-developed countries have only a few plants very highly concentrated on
one particular technique of electricity production (employing either traditional thermal
or hydroelectric plants). Developed countries, on the other hand, have access to nu-
clear and renewable-resource plants and are typically more diversiﬁed. Firms in these
countries will react diﬀerently to oil price shocks. Table 2 reports how the electricity
production of countries responds to oil price changes. The electricity production of
less-developed and small countries concentrated on few types of power plants is signif-
icantly more sensitive to oil price shocks than that of countries with a diverse set of
plants. More speciﬁcally, while the electricity production of countries concentrated on
a single energy source drops by about 1 percent after a 30 percent oil price hike, there
is no such drop for diversiﬁed countries. Firms in countries with diverse sources of
electricity can mitigate the negative impact of an oil price shock by substituting away
from oil. The share of oil in total energy consumption falls by 0.3 percent after a 30
percent oil price hike, whereas no substitution takes place in concentrated countries.
We next turn to the questions of what determines technological diversiﬁcation and
why poorer countries specialize in less sophisticated sectors. We extend the model
to allow for international mobility of goods and for cross-country diﬀerences in en-
dowments. Much as in models of endogenous growth and directed technical change,
the technological complexity of a sector in a given country evolves endogenously in
response to the incentives of the creators and users of new technologies. In particu-
lar, more input varieties will be directed towards sectors in which the country has a
comparative advantage, making them more complex and less volatile. The stage of
1Note that agricultural technology varies substantially with development. For example, of the top
20 wheat producers, India uses 2.3 tractors per 1,000 acres of arable land; this number is 128.8 for
Germany. Fertilizer use also varies hugely. India uses 21.9 tons of nitrogenous fertilizers per acre;
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inputs is subject to increasing returns to scale. Countries accumulate new inputs as
they develop, which brings about a gradual decline in their volatility. The speed of
development, and hence the speed with which volatility declines, may be inﬂuenced by
the initial level of volatility. If investment risk is harmful for growth, which is the case
for a range of plausible parameter values in our model, then poor and volatile countries
will develop slower and will remain highly volatile for long periods.2
The model delivers clear-cut predictions about the relationship among technological
diversiﬁcation, volatility, and productivity. Using sector-level data for a broad sample
of countries, we provide empirical support for these predictions. First, any given sector
is less volatile in developed countries. This result holds if we control for the quality
of institutions which may facilitate a smoother response to external shocks, such as
ﬁnancial development and the ﬂexibility of the labor market. Second, within a given
country, large, skill intensive sectors using complex technologies are less volatile. This
is consistent with our model which says that new inputs/technologies will be directed
towards such sectors, thus reducing volatility. These two mechanisms lead to a decline
in aggregate volatility as a country develops: The economy experiences less volatility
in each sector and resources move towards relatively safer sectors.
The link between volatility and development has been studied before by Acemoglu
and Zilibotti (1997), Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), Saint-Paul (1992), and Obstfeld
(1994), who describe the technology choice as a portfolio decision: In order to reap the
beneﬁts of high productivity and high growth, an economy has to bear more risk. The
risk tolerance typically relates to the level of development and the ﬁnancial structure of
the economy. Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997)’s model also features increasing returns to
scale: Early in the development process diversiﬁcation opportunities are limited, owing
to the scarcity of capital and the indivisibility of investment projects. This feature can
explain the high levels of sectoral concentration observed in poor countries. However,
all these models predict that at early stages of development countries will tend to
specialize in safer (even if less productive) sectors as a way of seeking insurance. This
prediction is not borne out by the data: Koren and Tenreyro (2004) document that
poor countries are highly concentrated in sectors that bear particularly high volatility.
In addition, these authors ﬁnd that most developing countries are inside the “mean-
2See Angeletos and Calvet (2001) and Angeletos (2004) for a discussion of how volatility aﬀects
investment. Note, however, that in these papers there is no explanation for why volatility is higher in
the ﬁrst place. Empirically, Ramey and Ramey (1995) ﬁnd that high-volatility countries grow slower.
Imbs (2004) studies the link between growth and volatility at the sectoral level, at which he ﬁnds a
positive correlation between the two. He argues that the negative relation at the aggregate level is
indicative of the harmful eﬀects of macroeconomic volatility.
8
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 551
November 2005variance frontier,” being highly prone to specialize in high-variance, low-mean sectors.
These ﬁndings contradict the predictions of the portfolio-based models and suggest that
important constraints must be at play, preventing developing countries from investing
in safer and, at the same time, more productive assets.3
Our model departs from the portfolio view of the world that features a necessary
trade-oﬀ between volatility and performance at the sector level. It can then naturally
accommodate the fact that poor countries tend to exhibit high sectoral concentration
and also that the high concentration falls mainly on high-risk sectors. In addition,
unlike in previous contributions, the volatility of individual sectors in our model is
endogenous: It depends on the level of development and the comparative advantage of
the country.
Our paper is related to previous work by Kraay and Ventura (2001). As in their
paper, the open-economy version of our model features the prediction that rich coun-
tries have a comparative advantage in less-volatile sectors. The diﬀerence lies in the
way this result is achieved. In Kraay and Ventura (2001), high-skill sectors, which
are prevalent in developed countries, enjoy less-elastic product demand. Markups can
then serve as a buﬀer against productivity shocks, reducing the volatility of high-skill
sectors. For example, a drop in output of a diﬀerentiated product makes that product
more expensive in the world market. This terms of trade improvement partly oﬀsets
the original shock. On the other hand, no such “terms-of-trade insurance” is taking
place for homogenous products that poor countries specialize in.
There are, however, empirical objections to the mechanism proposed by Kraay
and Ventura (2001) and its implications. The model predicts a negative relationship
between productivity shocks and terms-of-trade ﬂuctuations (particularly negative for
developed countries). That is, negative productivity shocks should be associated with
an improvement in the terms of trade. In the data, however, the relationship between
ﬂuctuations in labor productivity and the terms of trade is somewhat positive, and
there is no diﬀerence between rich and poor countries in terms of this relationship.4
Finally, our model builds on a vast literature on endogenous growth models in which
the development of new varieties of goods enhances productivity. (See for example,
3Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen and Yosha (2003) and Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) document that, for
highly developed countries, industrial specialization tends to increase with development. However,
as we later show, this does not result in higher aggregate volatility because these sectors tend to be
technologically diversiﬁed and are hence more stable than the rest of the economy. The fact that the
higher specialization of rich countries does not increase their aggregate risk has also been shown by
Koren and Tenreyro (2004).
4It is possible that other factors are at play, blurring the predicted relationship; at this point,
nonetheless, we can say that the extent of countercyclicality in the terms of trade is not the prima
facie mechanism behind the negative relationship between development and volatility.
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is to provide a uniﬁed framework for the explanation of development and volatility.
We provide sectoral evidence for a broad cross-section of countries that conﬁrms the
predictions of the model.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the
model. In Section 3 we discuss the empirical implications and oﬀer novel evidence in
support. We summarize and conclude in Section 4.
2 A Model of Technological Diversiﬁcation
2.1 A static model of technological diversiﬁcation, productiv-
ity, and volatility
In this section, we introduce a production process that features technological diversi-
ﬁcation: Input varieties contribute not only to higher productivity but also, because
inputs are subject to imperfectly correlated shocks, to lower volatility.











where Xi is capital services from capital variety i , N denotes the number of installed
machines and 1/(1 − σ) ∈ (0,∞) is the elasticity of substitution across varieties.5
Machines can fail randomly, in which case they irreversibly cease to contribute
to production. We assume that failure occurs independently across machines with
probability γ. We take the extreme assumption of independence for expositional clarity,
but our argument goes trhough as long as failures are imperfectly correlated. The
assumption that random failures turn the machine completely useless makes the model
more tractable []; however, technological diversiﬁcation would still take place with less
terminal shocks: Appendix A considers an example where there is only a partial drop
in productivity after a machine failure.
We assume that the machine can be used with diﬀerent intensities by employing
“operators.”Machine i can provide twice as much service if operated by twice as many
5As usual in endogenous growth models, we assume that σ > 0, that is, machines are gross
substitutes. Appendix A considers an example when this is not the case. Introducing additional
(scarce) factors of production would not change our qualitative results, it would just make the returns
to variety more decreasing.
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deﬁnition of labor units).
Formally, the services of machine i at time t are:
Xi =
(
li, if machine i is working;
0, otherwise;
(2)
where li is the number of operators.
Consider the output of a ﬁrm, in which n ≤ N machines are working, each providing
¯ X units of services,
Y = n
1/σ ¯ X. (3)
As is apparent from (3), productivity is increasing in the number of varieties holding
the amount of each individual variety ﬁxed. This is the usual “love of variety” eﬀect
of many endogenous growth models (Romer 1990, Grossman and Helpman 1991). The
eﬀect is stronger the lower is σ, that is, the less substitutable machines are. Intuitively,
if machines are highly substitutable, any additional variety is less needed.
The overall number of machine operators working at the ﬁrm is L =
P
li = n ¯ X,
since each working machine requires ¯ X operators and broken machines require none.
Hence (3) can be rewritten as
Y = n
1/σ−1L. (4)
Productivity is also increasing in the number of machines if we hold the total number
of operators (L) constant (since σ < 1). The dependence is weaker than in (3), because
any new machine requires operators taken away from old machines.
This implies that we have two alternative deﬁnitions of productivity, one holding
the operators per machine constant, the other holding the total number of operators
constant. We think both measures are useful, since the adjustment across diﬀerent
machine varieties can take place relatively fast within the ﬁrm (in particular, no hiring
or ﬁring of workers or capital installation is needed).7 In what follows, however, we will
6This is a way of capturing endogenous capacity utilization which is recently emphasized in business
cycle studies. Allowing for capacity constraints or decreasing returns to capacity utilization would not
alter our setting qualitatively. First, capacity constraints would not bind in equilibrium. Economic
growth takes place via the expansion of machine varieties while the services of an individual variety
shrink. Second, investors will be interested in the total, not the marginal proﬁt when deciding whether
to build a machine. This will remain positive even with decreasing returns to scale. Moreover, if the
cost function were isoelastic, the share of proﬁt in total revenue would be constant, just as in the
present formulation.
7The eﬀectiveness of this margin depends on how quickly and how eﬃciently machine operators can
switch between diﬀerent machines. Our assumption that any worker can operate any machine captures
the extreme case when such a switch is immediate and fully eﬃcient. In reality, of course, we would
11
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used in empirical work.
Given that the number of machines is a random variable (individual machines fail
at random and there is a ﬁnite number of machines), productivity will be random, too.
The number of working machines follows a binomial distribution with parameters N
and (1 − γ), where N is the number of installed machines, and γ is the probability of
failure:








The number of working machines has a mean of (1−γ)N and a variance of γ(1−γ)N.
Let a denote the log of productivity when the total number of operators (L) is held
constant.







Lower-case letters denote logarithms and we have introduced the notation φ = 1/σ−1 ∈
(0,1).
Using a ﬁrst-order Taylor approximation around lnE(n), the log number of ma-
chines can be written as:
lnn ≈ ln[(1 − γ)N] +
n − (1 − γ)N
(1 − γ)N
,
and hence the variance of lnn can be approximated by:
Var(lnn) ≈
Var(n)









The volatility of the log productivity declines with the existing number of machines.
Even though as N gets big, a failure gets more and more likely, the proportional (that
is, log) drop in the number of machines it induces is less and less important. As is
standard in statements of the law of large numbers, the second eﬀect outweighs the
ﬁrst one. In other words, diversiﬁcation across several machines makes log productivity
less volatile.
Given that N measures the number of inputs subject to diﬀerent shocks, we take it
as an index of technological complexity. It is clear from (3) and the discussion above that
see less than perfect ﬂexibility. However, as the skills needed to work with advanced technology are
very diverse (for example, Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003) document that computerization increased
the demand for non-routine cognitive tasks), we believe that such adjustment is important in practice.
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of productivity. In the next section, we endogenize the investment in new machines,
and consequently, the resulting level of technological complexity.
2.2 The dynamic model with endogenous number of varieties
What determines the level of technological complexity in the long run? In this section
we endogenize the decision to invest in machines. Much as in models of endogenous
growth (Romer 1990, Grossman and Helpman 1991, Aghion and Howitt 1992), machine
owners will be attracted by greater proﬁt opportunities.
We ﬁrst look at a one-sector economy to bring out the relationship between volatility
and development clearly. Later on (Section 2.3), we introduce multiple sectors and
investigate how the relative complexity of sectors evolve endogenously.
Technology will be the same as in (1), which results in the following aggregate
production function for the ﬁnal good (4):
Y = n
φL.
Using machines in production involves increasing returns to scale: Machines are
indivisible. This means that anyone operating a machine has to buy one unit of the
machine beforehand. This minimum scale requirement limits the scope of diversiﬁca-
tion across machine varieties.8
Since we are interested in the inner workings of a sector and how technology choice
aﬀects volatility, we posit increasing returns at the input level. Indivisibility and
minimum scale requirements are inherent characteristics of many an input used in
technologically advanced sectors. Note that increasing returns are also a feature of
the use of the machines, not only their invention or production. That is, we assume
that machines can be produced and bought in any quantity but only a full unit is
productive.
The setup of a machine requires κ units of the ﬁnal good. Once the machine is
set up, the owner gains monopoly power over its services. This monopoly lasts until
the machine (exogenously) becomes obsolete. We adopt a continuous-time formulation
and assume that the random lifetime of the machine is exponentially distributed with
parameter γ.
8Note that there is no incentive to install two or more units of a single machine variety, both
because the production function features a “love of variety” and because machines are subject to
idiosyncratic shocks. A similar assumption is made by Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) who work with
minimum scale requirements at the industry level.
13
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the number of machines is assumed to evolve according to the following Itˆ o process:
dnt = (It/κ − γnt)dt +
√
γnt dz, (5)
where dz is the increment of a standard Wiener process. During a dt period It/κ new
machines are built and γnt fail. Since failure is random, we include a diﬀusion term
with instantaneous variance γnt.9
Modelling the number of machines as a diﬀusion process involves two major sim-
pliﬁcations. First, we approximate the number of machines with a continuous real
variable to avoid integer problems. Second, we assume that the change in the number
of machines over a dt period of time is normally distributed. Both simpliﬁcations are
only meant to ease the exposition and they are not crucial for any of our results.
Without the diﬀusion approximation, the number of machines follows a discrete-
state Markov process known as the birth and death process. In this case, all endoge-
nous variables follow jump processes, requiring a somewhat diﬀerent apparatus than
is presented here. The discrete-state derivations and a formal proof of how the birth
and death process can be approximated by the above diﬀusion are available from the
authors upon request.
The economic environment is characterized as follows. The ﬁnal good sector is
perfectly competitive, that is, ﬁrms take output and input prices as given. In contrast,
machine providers act as monopolistic competitors, that is, they are price setters for
their own machine but take the overall price of the composite machine varieties as
given.10
2.2.1 Consumers
There is a continuum of symmetric consumers/investors with unit mass. Each con-
sumer has access to the well-diversiﬁed mutual fund of all machines. They can trade
the share of this mutual fund freely, instantly, and in any quantity (even shorting is
allowed). This will ensure that the mutual fund is priced by the consumer’s stochastic
9Recall that in the static case, the variance of n was γ∆t(1 − γ∆t)N. As we approach the
continuous-time limit, ∆t → 0, the variance becomes γN dt.
10Note that this is a valid assumption even if there is a ﬁnite number of diﬀerent machine varieties.
First, the market share of each machine owner falls at the rate 1/n, whereas the standard deviation
of output is of order 1/
√
n. That is, even if n is large enough to make monopolistic competition a
realistic assumption, we still have positive aggregate volatility. Second, volatility falls with the number
of independent machine varieties, which may be smaller than the number of machine owners if some
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ket. Note that there is no positive supply of a riskless asset in the economy, in other
words, every production technology is risky.11 Each consumer supplies L units of labor
inelastically in the labor market. Consumers decide how much to consume and how
much to invest in the mutual fund of machines, taking the rate of return and wage rate
as given.
Time is continuous and consumers maximize lifetime expected utility over consump-









subject to a standard intertemporal budget constraint,




The change in the asset holding of consumer i, dai, comes from dividend yield (D/P)
on the asset and labor income (wL) minus consumption (Ci). There are (possibly
random) capital gains contributing to a change wealth, ai dP/P.
Stock prices follow a diﬀusion process with drift µP and instantaneous variance σ2
P,
dP/P = µP dt + σP dz. (8)
In general equilibrium, the stochastic properties of the stock price depend on the state
of the economy, as we will show in section 2.2.3. For simplicity, we suppress this
dependence in notation.
The investor chooses a consumption plan C(n,t), determining a level of consump-
tion for each time t and state n. Assuming that this plan is twice continuously diﬀer-
entiable in n, consumption will follow a diﬀusion process
dC/C = µc dt + σc dz. (9)
The drift and the instantaneous variance depend on the optimal policy function and
the evolution of n. Note that the diﬀusion term (dz) is the same in (8) and (9)
because we assume that asset markets are complete. In other words, stock returns and
consumption are instantaneously perfectly correlated.
We assume that there exists no arbitrage. This implies that there exists a unique









11Alternatively, the rate of return on a riskless asset (for example, storage) is so low that investors
do not demand a positive amount.
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T (a stochastic discount factor). The value of any asset today is the sum of expected
discounted future price and the discounted sum of dividends. This is analogous to the
discrete-time asset pricing equation pt = Et(mTPT +
P
msDs).
Equation (10) can be rewritten as
Et [ξtDt dt + d(ξtPt)] = 0. (11)
Given the the stochastic process for the state prices, the investor can sell her claims
on future labor income and purchase the relevant Arrow-Debreu securities to ﬁnance
her consumption. That is, her optimization problem is equivalent to maximizing (6)








The ﬁrst-order condition of this simple maximization problem is
exp(−ρt)C
−θ
t = λξt, (13)
for all t and state of the world, that is, marginal utility is proportional to the state
price.












dt − θσc dz, (14)
where µc and σ2
c refer to the proportional drift and diﬀusion of C, respectively. Mar-
ginal utility declines with impatience and with the mean consumption growth rate and
increases with consumption volatility (that is, the convexity of marginal utility gives
rise to precautionary saving motives).
We can now reformulate the asset pricing equation (11). The expected change in
the discounted asset price (inclusive of dividends) can be zero only if the sum of all
drift terms is zero. Formally,
0 = µξ + D/P + µP + σξσP, (15)










where r refers to the sum of dividend yield and mean price decrease of stocks.
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sumption depends positively on the mean rate of return, with a coeﬃcient equal to the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution, 1/θ. At the same time, because the consumer’s
portfolio is risky, its covariance with consumption will make saving less attractive and
will hence result in lower consumption growth. Given that we have complete markets,
in other words, there is only one source of uncertainty in the economy, the instan-
taneous correlation between stock prices and consumption is 1, so the covariance is
σcσP. Finally, since future consumption is risky, prudent consumers have precaution-
ary savings depending on the volatility of consumption and the degree of prudence,
(θ + 1)/2.
2.2.2 Firms
To derive the equilibrium of the economy, let us consider the pricing decisions of ﬁrms



















and ﬁnal demand Y as given, the machine owner faces a constant elasticity demand
curve with elasticity 1/(1 − σ).
She will hence follow a constant markup rule when pricing its services. The optimal
monopoly price of each capital service will be
χi = w/σ,
where w is the wage rate. Final good prices are, in turn, determined from the price of
the services of an individual machine and the number of machines.
Proﬁt maximization implies that price equals marginal cost in the ﬁnal good sector.











This implies that wages increase in productivity:
w = n
φ.




Xi = nXi = L.
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wages. Total wages are wL, hence the wage costs of a single machine operating ﬁrm
are wL/n (by symmetry), implying that proﬁts are
πi = φwL/n. (17)
The owner of a machine uses this proﬁt ﬂow to calculate the lifetime cash-ﬂow of the
machine. Investors take the number of installed capital varieties, the wage rate, capital
prices, and the return on equity as given.
2.2.3 Equilibrium
In an equilibrium of the economy (i) consumers optimally set their consumption path
((16) holds), (ii) ﬁrms maximize their proﬁt in each period (giving (17)), (iii) dividends
equal proﬁts and the ﬁnancial wealth of households equals the total value of machines,
and (iv) aggregate output is either consumed or invested into new machines.
We assume free entry into the machine market. This means that any investor can
buy κ units of ﬁnal good and install a new machine variety. As long as there is positive
entry, this pins down the value of a machine at V = κ.12 We further assume that the
sunk cost required to install a machine is falling with the level of technological progress,
n, because of spillovers or learning-by-doing externalities. In particular, it falls at a
rate φ−1 to ensure balanced growth. Expanding variety growth models usually make a
similar assumption to ensure long-run growth (Grossman and Helpman 1991, Chapter
3). Alternatively, one could set φ = 1 by restricting the elasticity of substitution across
varieties to be 2. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, Chapter 6) put restrictions on the
elasticity of substitution across input varieties. Either assumption delivers balanced
growth and qualitatively similar results.
Also, we assume that ﬁxed costs are proportional to the overall size of the economy,
L. This assumption ensures that the growth rate is not dependent on country size.
(See Jones (1995) on the “scale eﬀect” of endogenous growth models.) Recall that
κ measures the unit of a machine variety that is subject to variety speciﬁc shocks.
Arguably, bigger countries use more capital of each variety and therefore require a
bigger investment. Our main results are not sensitive to this assumption. The only
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where we have used w = nφ and κ = κ0Lnφ−1. The dividend yield is higher the higher
the proﬁt rate and the lower the ﬁxed cost of installing a machine. The assumption
of falling ﬁxed costs ensured that the dividend yield does not vanish as n increases. If
the dividend yield tended to zero as n became large, we would obtain a steady-state
distribution of n instead of an ever-growing economy.
Note that even if the dividend yield on a machine is constant, the rate of return is
random, because there are random capital losses due to machine failures. This results
in an average depreciation rate (and hence capital loss) γ∆t over a period ∆t, but this
capital loss is random even as we take ∆t → 0. We next turn to characterizing the
stochastic process driving the value of machines.
Let A =
R
i ai di denote the aggregate ﬁnancial wealth in the economy. Aggregating













In equilibrium ﬁnancial wealth equals the value of all machines, A = nV = nκ. We









= −γ dt +
p
γ/nt dz, (21)
where we have made use of the facts that the sum of dividends and wages is equal to
total output and that saving is equal to investment into new machines.
We ﬁnd the equilibrium as follows. We posit a policy function, C = v(n), that
describes the optimal amount of consumption given the number of machines in the














































where we have omitted the argument n from v(n) for brevity.
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on the consumption policy. By equilibrium in the ﬁnal good market,
Y = n
φL = v(n) + (µn + γ)nκ = v(n) + (µn + γ)n
φκ0L. (23)
Total output has to equal the value of consumption plus investment. Investment is the
sum of net investment (µn) and the replacement of broken machines (γ).
Equations (22) and (23) together with σ2
n = γ/n deﬁne a second-order ordinary
diﬀerential equation for v, which has two linearly independent solutions. We therefore
need two boundary conditions to pin down the optimal policy function, v(n). One
is that no consumption takes place without capital, v(0) = 0. The other one comes
from the fact that as n becomes arbitrarily large, σ2
n becomes zero and the economy
resembles a non-stochastic Ramsey model. Consumption growth in the non-stochastic





= ˜ µc = (r − ρ)/θ.
To obtain an analytical solution, we put restrictions on the CRRA and the elastic-
ity of substitution across machine varieties and assume that θφ = 1.13 Whether this
is plausible depends on how broadly we interpret machine varieties. If these are dif-
ferent intermediate inputs necessary to produce a particular good, the inputs may be
strong complements, in which case the elasticity is less than one. This would lead to a
negative φ which we have ruled out (but see Appendix A for an example of such a pro-
duction function). However, if we think of machine varieties as representing alternative
production techniques that can highly substitute each other, then higher elasticities
are more plausible. For example the elasticity of substitution across goods produced
in diﬀerent countries (within a narrow product category) is estimated to be around
4–7 (Hummels 2001). Estimates based on the time series of U.S. imports are usually
lower, in the range of 1–2 (Gallaway, McDaniel and Rivera 2003). For an intermedi-
ate range of 3–4, the value of φ is 1/2–1/3, resulting in a θ of 2–3. This is plausible
both as a measure of relative risk aversion and as an inverse elasticity of intertemporal
substitution (Vissing-Jørgensen 2002).
13For other values of relative risk aversion, numerical techniques can be applied to solve (22). If
θ < 1/φ, then the saving rate is increasing in n. Intuitively, low-θ consumers are less prudent, so the
precautionary motive is relatively small. This means that risk aversion dominates and saving declines
with volatility. In this case, poor countries develop slowly because their excess volatility discourages
investment. The reverse is true for θ > 1/φ. Similarly to Angeletos (2004), we have the cutoﬀ at
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where v0 is given by
v0 = (1 − φ)L + ρκ0L. (24)
Proof. Direct substitution reveals that whenever v0 satisﬁes (24), v0nφ satisﬁes (22).
For this policy function, v00n2/v = φ(φ − 1), v0n/v = φ, and µn is independent of n.
Since v0nφ also satisﬁes the boundary conditions, it is a unique solution.
Deﬁning the value of all the machines as K = nκ, equation (24) can be rewritten
in terms of aggregate variables as
Y − C = φY − ρK = (φ − ρκ0)Y,
since the capital output ratio in this economy is nκ0Lnφ−1/(nφL) = κ0. Investors save
(and invest) a constant fraction of current output. The saving rate is increasing in
the proﬁt rate (φ) and decreasing in the degree of impatience (ρ) and sunk cost of
investment (κ0).
From (23), we can express the growth rate of the number of machines as
µn = φ/κ0 − γ − ρ,
resulting in an output growth rate of
φµn = φ(φ/κ0 − γ − ρ).
This completes the characterization of the dynamic equilibrium of this economy. Coun-
tries with high proﬁt rates and low investment costs will develop faster, implying both
a faster growth of output and a faster fall of volatility. In the next section, we extend
the model in two directions in order to account for the diﬀerences in specialization
patterns between rich and poor countries.
2.3 Extension to multiple sectors
As we have documented in Koren and Tenreyro (2004), intrinsic volatility diﬀerences
across sectors together with countries’ diﬀerent patterns of specialization are respon-
sible for an important portion of the diﬀerence in output volatility between rich and
poor countries. In this section, we allow for a richer characterization of the economy,
by extending the model to a multi-sector economy. The sectors diﬀer in the extent of
skill intensity. We introduce a multi-country setup, allowing for cross-country diﬀer-
ences in endowments and compare the results for closed and open economies. Allowing
for international trade, as we later show, can explain the observation that poor coun-
tries specialize in less sophisticated sectors. In fact, comparative advantage magniﬁes
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patterns of specialization. As in other multi-sector models of endogenous technology,
we will have directed technical change (Acemoglu 2002, Caselli and Coleman 2000).
Proﬁts per machine variety will depend on the size of the sector (number of available
operators), its relative wage, the degree of competition (number of existing machines),
and trade openness.
Suppose that there are S sectors, each using the same CES technology but requiring
diﬀerent levels of skill for machine operation. In particular, sector s requires that each
operator possesses at least hs amount of human capital, and we order sectors such that
hS > hS−1 > ... > h1. The output of machine i in sector s is
Xis =
(
hslit, if machine i is working;
0, otherwise,
where lit is the number of workers on machine i who are “qualiﬁed” to operate the
machine in the sense that they have a level of human capital higher than hs.
We assume that the country is a small open economy freely trading the output of
all ﬁnal good sectors at an exogenously given world price, ˜ ps. Note that, as standard in
small open-economy models with free trade, the production structure is independent of
demand considerations. Relative demand for the output of the sectors (in our case, the
consumption/investment decision) will matter only for the patterns of trade. Appendix
B discusses the diﬀerences between a closed and an open economy in more detail.
We assume that the individual machine varieties cannot be traded. In other words,
investors can buy foreign capital goods and install them in their own country as ma-
chines, but the physical machines installed abroad cannot contribute to production.14
This assumption ensures that countries cannot circumvent the ﬁxed costs of machine
operation by importing machine services from abroad and hence cannot fully diversify
instantly. The number of machines in the country will hence be a state variable that
can only be adjusted gradually. At any given point in time, the number of available
machines and hence overall technological complexity is given. In the long run, invest-
ment in new machines will determine technological complexity, economic development,
and volatility.
Trade is balanced at any point in time, ruling out international borrowing and
lending. This also means that investment is ﬁnite (growth in the number of machines
14If we interpret machine varieties as diﬀerent techniques of production, this amounts to very
costly imitation and no technology spillovers across countries. Comin and Hobijn (2004) document
a relatively slow adoption of leading technologies developed elsewhere. A positive but ﬁnite cost of
technology adoption could be modelled such that machine varieties already in use abroad have a lower
installation cost ˜ κ < κ. A ˜ κ > 0 would be suﬃcient to deliver qualitatively similar results.
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in exchange for foreign capital goods. In contrast, if we allow for borrowing, investors
can immediately borrow to replace a broken machine, smoothing out some of the shock
to productivity. We assume away such consumption smoothing behavior because the
current accounts of countries (especially those of less-developed ones) do not seem to
act as buﬀers against productivity shocks.15
There are altogether L workers in the economy, and their human capital endowment
is distributed according to a cumulative distribution function F(h). The number of
workers capable of operating machines in sector s is hence [1 − F(hs)]L.
Given the number of machines in each sector, (n1,n2,...,nS), labor market equilib-
rium requires that each worker be employed on machines that require the highest skill
level that this worker can supply.16
This implies that a fraction 1 − F(hS) of workers is employed in sector S, and a




where αs is deﬁned as the share of workers in sector s, F(hs+1) − F(hs) (deﬁned for
all s with h0 = 0, hS = ∞). Proﬁts per machine are a constant, (1 − σ), fraction of
revenues per machine,
πs = (1 − σ)˜ psn
φ−1
s hsαsL,
where ˜ ps is the price of product s determined in world markets.
Directed technical change will equate per-machine proﬁts across sectors, πs = πz,









A sector will use relatively more machines if it is producing an expensive good, it
is skill intensive, or has a bigger pool of workers with matching skills. Such sectors
are also more productive and less volatile. In other words, given the overall number
of machines, n = n1 + n2 + ... + nS, technological complexity and productivity are
increasing, while volatility is decreasing in the sector’s skill intensity and its share in
total employment.
15Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2003) show that the beta coeﬃcient of consumption response to output
shocks of countries is close to one.
16To prove this, suppose there exists a worker with human capital level hj ≥ hs+1 (that is, capable
of working in sector s + 1) working in sector s. This worker is not willing to switch to sector s + 1
because ws+1 < ws. But all workers in sector s + 1 are capable of operating sector s machinery, and
they would earn higher wages in that sector. Hence this cannot be an equilibrium.
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lnVaris = 2lnφ + lnγ − lnnis = νi − [ln ˜ ps + lnhs + ln(Lis/Li)]/(1 − φ), (26)
where νi is a country ﬁxed eﬀect.
This is a key equation for our empirical exercise. While we can measure a sector’s
skill intensity and its share in employment, we do not observe ˜ ps, the price of the
sector’s output in world markets. Instead, we interpret it broadly as an unobserved
sector-speciﬁc variable that aﬀects the level of complexity, capturing not only variations
in the value of output but also, for example, technological diﬀerences across sectors.
Note that this variable is common across countries within a given sector, so we can
control for it using either sector ﬁxed eﬀects or observing technological complexity in
any given country.
For interested readers, Appendix B discusses in depth an example with two sectors.
3 Productivity, Volatility, and Technological Complexity: The
Empirical Evidence
The model developed in the previous sections leads to a set of predictions concerning
the relationships among productivity, volatility, and technological diversiﬁcation. We
discuss these predictions in light of the empirical evidence.
Prediction 1. GDP volatility declines with development.
This is one of the stylized facts in the literature and the main motivation of this
paper. There are large cross-country diﬀerences in volatility. The standard deviation
of annual GDP growth during the period 1970 through 2000 ranges from 1.4 percent
to 21.8 percent (a factor of 15) across 167 countries. The most volatile decile of
countries had a standard deviation of GDP growth of 12.9 percent. This is seven times
as high as the volatility of the least volatile decile (1.8 percent). This cross-country
variation in volatility is highly correlated with the cross-country variation in the level
of development, gauged by real GDP per capita. More speciﬁcally, as shown in Table
4, the elasticity of GDP variance with respect to GDP per capita is −0.326 (with a
robust standard error of 0.066).17
In the model, investment in new machines brings about development and a gradual
decline in volatility. Countries that have few machines are both less developed and
more volatile. In the multi-sector version, our model proposes two channels to ex-
plain this negative association. First, a within-sector channel, whereby a given sector
exhibits higher technological complexity in more-developed countries. This, in turn,
17Table 3 presents the list of countries included in the computation.
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tries. Second, a compositional channel, whereby poor countries specialize in relatively
less complex sectors. This implies that poor countries concentrate in sectors with (ab-
solute) lower productivity and higher variance. In what follows, we check the empirical
consistency of the predictions associated with these two channels.
Prediction 2. For any given sector, poor countries utilize less complex technologies.
This implies that for any sector poor countries are both less productive and more
volatile.
• For a given sector, poor countries utilize less complex technologies.
Various studies have explored the process of technology diﬀusion across countries.
For example, Caselli and Coleman (2000), document that the adoption of computers
depends heavily on the level of development of the country, and, more speciﬁcally, on
the level of human capital. Caselli and Wilson (2004) show that this result extends to
a broader set of high-technology equipment (where the extent of technology embodied
in capital equipment is measured as the R&D content).
Our model implies that these cross-country diﬀerences in technology are also present
within sectors. Since directed technical change equates the rates of return on machines
in all sectors, poor countries will use proportionately fewer machines in all sectors,
holding comparative advantage patterns constant.
The two examples mentioned in the introduction suggest important cross-country
technological diﬀerences for a given sector: Developed countries tend to use more agri-
cultural machinery, fertilizers, and pesticides in agriculture and have access to more
types of power plants in the energy sector. Recent empirical studies provide additional
support for this observation. For example, Comin and Hobijn (2004) document how
speciﬁc technological innovations have spread across countries. Many of these inno-
vations are relevant only to certain sectors (for example, mule spindle, blast oxygen
furnace, internal combustion engine, aviation). The authors show that most innova-
tions originated in developed countries and spread gradually to less-developed coun-
tries. This implies that in any given year, in all relevant sectors, poor countries use
less sophisticated production techniques than rich ones.
• For a given sector, poor countries are both less productive and more volatile.
In the context of our model, the previous ﬁnding, in turn, implies that a given sector
is both less productive and more volatile in poor countries. We test this prediction using
sectoral data from the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO,
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from 1963 to 1998 for a sample of 64 countries, providing information on employment
and value added on an annual basis. Table 3 indicates the countries for which the
data are available and Table 5 reports the index of technological diversiﬁcation for
each sector, with the corresponding (average) size of the sector in manufacturing. We
compute the sample average of labor productivity for each country and sector. As a
measure of volatility, we use the 5-year variance of labor productivity (value added per
worker) growth.
To check the consistency of the prediction, we ﬁrst regress the (log of) sectoral labor
productivity on the level of development, proxied by the (log of) real GDP per capita
of the country, controlling for sector-speciﬁc dummies. The regression yields a positive
and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient: As shown in the ﬁrst column of Table 6, the point estimate
for the elasticity is 0.70 (with a country-clustered standard error of 0.07). This means
that, on average, any given sector is signiﬁcantly less productive in poor countries.
Similarly, we regress the (log of) sectoral variance on the level of development,
including sector-speciﬁc dummies. We obtain a negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient,
displayed in the second column of Table 6. The estimated elasticity is −0.30 (with
a country-clustered standard error of 0.10), implying that, on average, every sector is
signiﬁcantly more volatile in poor countries.
Prediction 3. More complex sectors are both more productive and less volatile. A
mean-variance frontier might not exist.
• More complex sectors are both more productive and less volatile.
This is a direct prediction of production with “technological diversiﬁcation.” To
test this prediction, we use the measures of labor productivity and volatility computed
from the UNIDO data set we referred to before.
Central to this test is the construction of a measure of technological complexity.
Following Clague (1991), we measure the technological complexity of a sector by the
diversity of inputs it uses. A sector is more complex if it uses more varieties of capital
goods. There are two practical shortcomings with this measure of complexity. First,
there are no comprehensive data on sector-level input usages for most countries in
the sample. Second, even if the data were available, the actual extent of complexity
observed would respond endogenously to the level of development of the country and
the relative abundance of skilled labor.
To address these issues, we use the approach followed by Clague (1991) and Rajan
and Zingales (1998) and calculate the complexity measures for sectors in the U.S. There
are two key assumptions for the validity of the test we will perform: First, there are
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tal goods than others. Second, these technological diﬀerences persist across countries,
leading to a positive correlation between the rankings of technological complexity in
the United States and any other given country.18 More formally, as discussed after
equation (26), we treat these complexity measures as a proxy for unobserved tech-
nological complexity that is not explained by the sector’s skill intensity and relative
size.
To calculate our measure of technological diversity, we use the 1997 Capital Flow
Tables of the Bureau of Economic Analysis. This table distinguishes 180 capital good
categories (structures, equipment, and software), each usually corresponding to a 6-
digit 1997 NAICS category. We then measure technological diversiﬁcation as the in-
verse the Herﬁndahl index of investment expenditure shares. Table 5 reports the (log)
technological diversiﬁcation index for each of the sectors in our sample.
The simple correlation between (log of) labor productivity and our index of tech-
nological diversity is positive and statistically signiﬁcant (without and with country-
speciﬁc dummies). However, one might argue that this strong positive correlation
might be driven by other determinants. For example, capital intensity is likely to be
correlated with the level of technological diversiﬁcation and also to inﬂuence produc-
tivity. Incidentally, our model also predicts that the skill intensity of the sector also
inﬂuences the productivity of the sector. The ﬁrst column in Table 7 shows the within-
country regression results, after controlling for the additional potential determinants
of labor productivity. We control for the share of materials in the sector, its skill
and capital intensity (measured by the share of skilled or semi-skilled workers in pro-
duction and the value of equipment per worker, respectively), and the relative size of
the sector. The regression shows that technological diversiﬁcation is signiﬁcantly and
positively correlated with the level of labor productivity. A one-standard-deviation
increase in the measure of technological diversiﬁcation is associated with a 3 percent
increase in the level of productivity. Also in line with our predictions, skill intensity
raises productivity.
The same considerations stated before lead us to include a similar set of controls in
the regression of (log) variance on the extent of technological diversiﬁcation. The results
are summarized in the second column of Table 7. Technological diversiﬁcation is sig-
niﬁcantly and negatively associated with sectoral volatility. A one-standard-deviation
increase in technological diversiﬁcation is associated with a 4 percent decrease in the
18A meaure of technological complexity based on the U.S. is a noisy measure of the complexity of
a sector in other countries. As Raddatz (2003) argues, to the extent that the noise corresponds to
classical measurement error, the coeﬃcients we are interested in will be biased towards zero, against
the hypothesis of our study.
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document in more detail, the size of the sector.
• There is no evidence of a mean-variance frontier.
As discussed before, portfolio-view models predict a positive correlation between
mean productivity and variance. However, in the data, the simple correlation between
volatility and productivity is negative (−0.10 and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero).
Controlling for sectoral size, and country- and sector-speciﬁc eﬀects yields no positive
relationship between the two variables. Using a diﬀerent approach, Koren and Tenreyro
(2004) also reject the notion that countries move along a mean-variance frontier in the
data.
Our model is consistent and, in fact, predicts the absence of a mean-variance fron-
tier: As countries develop, they use more sophisticated technologies, which leads both
to higher productivity and lower variance.
Prediction 4. Poor countries have a comparative advantage in less complex and hence
riskier sectors. Consequently, poor countries specialize in less technologically complex
sectors. This also implies that poor countries specialize in more volatile sectors.
• Poor countries have a comparative advantage in less complex and hence riskier
sectors. Consequently, poor countries specialize in less technologically complex
sectors.
As seen in Sections B and 2.3, skill intensive sectors will endogenously become more
complex. This implies that skill abundant countries have a comparative advantage in
complex sectors. Note that even a small diﬀerence in skill abundance can result in a
large comparative advantage because of directed technical change.
That poor countries have a comparative advantage in less complex sectors was
ﬁrst documented by Clague (1991). He ﬁnds that poor countries are relatively less
eﬃcient in industries with a lower index of technological complexity (where complexity
is measured similarly to the method employed in the present paper).
This pattern of comparative advantage, according to the model, implies that poor
countries should specialize in less complex sectors. We checked this implication, by
examining the sectoral composition of the economy. Using the UNIDO data set, we
regressed the (log) average sectoral shares on a) the index of technological diversiﬁca-
tion of the sector; b) the level of development, proxied by the (log) level of GDP of the
country; and c) the interaction between sectoral variance and the level of development.
According to the model, the interaction term should be positive: As countries develop,
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interaction term is positive and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, consistent with the
model.
• Poor countries specialize in more volatile sectors.
To check whether the pattern of comparative advantage might also imply that poor
countries specialize in relatively more volatile sectors, we regress the (log) average
sectoral shares on i) the variance of the sector; b) the (log) of GDP of the country;
and c) the interaction between sectoral variance and the level of development. As
the model predicts, the regression yields a negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for the
interaction term, implying that more developed countries tend to specialize in lower-
variance sectors. The results are displayed in Table 8b, which shows the regressions
without and with country-ﬁxed eﬀects.
Prediction 5. Larger sectors, in which the country has a comparative advantage are
less volatile.
Proﬁts for an individual machine owner are larger in large sectors (with more ma-
chine operators), ceteris paribus. Hence more machines will be attracted toward large
sectors, making them less volatile. (See equation (26).) The size of the sector, in turn,
is determined by its comparative advantage, implying that sectors with a comparative
advantage are less volatile than sectors with comparative disadvantage.
Table 9 shows that sectors with a larger share of employment are less volatile even
when controlling for country and industry ﬁxed eﬀects. This remains true of we control
for other sectoral characteristics such as capital and skill intensity, and technological
complexity (Table 7).
Canning, Amaral, Lee, Meyer and Stanley (1998) explored the relationship between
GDP volatility and the size of the economy, ﬁnding that variance falls with size with
an elasticity of about 1/6. We ﬁnd very similar elasticities for the size of a sector. Note
that if all risks are idiosyncratic to individual workers or machines, the fall in volatility
should be faster, with an elasticity of 1. Canning et al. argue that interactions across
economic actors magnify the aggregate importance of idiosyncratic risk. An alternative
explanation for why idiosyncratic shocks are important in the aggregate is provided by
Gabaix (2004). He shows that if the size distribution of ﬁrms has an inﬁnite variance
(such as, for example, a Pareto distribution), the decay of idiosyncratic risk with
respect to size is slower. In our model, we can account for the slow decay of volatility
with size if we assume that each machine has a random productivity drawn from a
Pareto distribution. Then, we will have few very productive machines employing many
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productivity.
3.1 Robustness
In this section, we conduct a number of robustness checks for our empirical results.
First, some institutions may facilitate the response to external sectoral shocks. Since
rich countries have better institutions, this may contribute to lower output volatility.
We therefore look at the role of ﬁnancial development and labor market ﬂexibility in
reducing volatility.
Financial development makes raising capital cheaper and faster. Hence if ﬁrms
are hit by liquidity shocks, they can borrow the necessary funds without signiﬁcantly
disrupting production. This can make the productivity of ﬁrms smoother, especially
over shorter horizons. Aghion, Angeletos, Banerjee and Manova (2004) show how the
liquidity needs of long-term investments make output volatile in ﬁnancially underde-
veloped countries. Empirically, Braun and Larrain (forthcoming) and Larrain (2004)
have shown that ﬁnancial development makes output less volatile, especially in highly
ﬁnance dependent sectors.
Our model can easily incorporate the pattern that volatility declines with ﬁnan-
cial development. The development of new inputs requires ﬁnancing, because initial
development/installation costs have to be covered up front. The value of new ma-
chines will hence be higher in ﬁnancially developed countries where the cost of capital
is lower, making these countries less volatile. Across sectors, diﬀerences in ﬁnancing
needs (“external ﬁnance dependence”) lead to similar predictions.
Column 2 of Table 10 reports the regression of sectoral variance on the level of GDP
and the degree of ﬁnancial development, gauged by private credit over GDP. We con-
trol for sector-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. Financial development leads to signiﬁcantly lower
volatility, but the eﬀect of general economic development also remains signiﬁcantly
negative.
Our measure of volatility is the variance of labor productivity (value added per
worker) growth. This may be higher in countries with rigid labor markets, because
ﬁrms are less able to react to demand shocks. For example, if the demand for the
product of a particular ﬁrm falls, optimally it would downsize its workforce. However,
ﬁring costs and regulations make this costly, so the ﬁrm retains its workers in the hope
that the shock is transitory. In the data we would observe this shock as if it were a
negative productivity shock; less output is produced with the same number of workers.
To see whether this measurement problem contaminates our results, we control for
the costs of modifying and terminating employment contracts across countries, as com-
piled by Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Schleifer and Lopez-de-Silanes (2004). As Column
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productivity within any given sector. However, this does not alter our prediction that
volatility declines with development; in fact, the point estimate of the coeﬃcient of
GDP is greater in absolute value. Intuitively, some highly developed countries have
rather rigid labor markets (notably European countries) but are still highly stable in
terms of labor productivity.
In Column 4, we control for both ﬁnancial development and labor market rigidities.
The eﬀect of overall economic development is still highly signiﬁcant with a coeﬃcient
very similar to our benchmark estimates.
An alternative explanation for the decline of volatility with development is that high-
income countries specialize in diﬀerentiated products, which are subject to idiosyncratic
demand and supply shocks. This could result in lower volatility because idiosyncratic
shocks wash out when aggregated over many products. Also, if sectors producing
multiple diﬀerentiated products use a wider variety of inputs, then “output diversiﬁ-
cation” is correlated with “input diversiﬁcation,” which potentially biases our results
on technological diversiﬁcation.
To test for the presence of output diversiﬁcation, the use of ﬁrm-level data would be
desirable. Lacking such data, however, we can use data on the number of establishments
reported by UNIDO. If products are diﬀerentiated by producer ﬁrms and these products
are subject to idiosyncratic demand or supply shocks, the volatility of a sector should
decline with the number of ﬁrms.
Our model also predicts that larger sectors should be less volatile. The distinction
between the two theories relies in the margin through which this takes place. Output
diversiﬁcation takes place across ﬁrms, hence volatility declines with the number of
ﬁrms (extensive margin) but not with the average size of ﬁrms (intensive margins). In
our model, larger ﬁrms attract proportionately more machines, and hence both margins
are equally important.
To test the relative importance of the extensive and intensive margins, we decom-
pose the size of sector s in country i, Lis, into the number of ﬁrms and the average size
of ﬁrms,
lnLis = lnNis + ln(Lis/Nis).
We then regress the log variance of a sector on the log number of ﬁrms and the log of
their average size, controlling for both country- and industry-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. The
output diversiﬁcation would suggest that the number of ﬁrms decreases volatility while
ﬁrm size does not. Table 11 reports our results. Both the extensive and the intensive
margins of sector size contribute to lower volatility, and, in line with our theory, there
is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the importance of the two. Moreover, when we only focus
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still no signiﬁcant diﬀerences. This suggests that “output diversiﬁcation” does not
signiﬁcantly contribute to the decline in volatility.
4 Conclusion
This paper proposes a model in which the production process makes use of diﬀerent
input varieties, which are subject to imperfectly correlated shocks. As in other expand-
ing variety growth models, technological progress takes place as an expansion in the
number of input varieties, increasing productivity. The new insight we develop is that
the expansion in varieties also leads to lower volatility of production via two channels.
First, as each individual variety matters less and less in production, the contribution of
idiosyncratic ﬂuctuations to overall volatility declines. Second, each additional input
provides a new adjustment margin in response to external shocks, making productivity
less volatile.
In the model, the number of varieties evolves endogenously in response to proﬁt
incentives. The consequent change in volatility associated with changes in the number
of varieties feeds back into the investment and savings decisions of producers.
The model yields empirical predictions concerning the relationships among pro-
ductivity, volatility, technological complexity, and comparative advantage. We discuss
these predictions in light of the existing empirical evidence and provide novel ﬁndings
supporting the results.
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In the benchmark model we assume that σ ∈ (0,1), that is, the elasticity of substitution
across machine varieties is bigger than 1 (the machines are gross substitutes). This is
a standard assumption in the expanding variety literature and is needed to ensure that
the varieties not yet invented (or installed) are not essential in production.
However, complementarities across diﬀerent inputs (or tasks) may be an important
feature of the development process. As Kremer (1993) points out, many production
processes feature an “O-ring” technology: even if a single input fails, it may jeopardize
the whole outcome. (Also see Young (1993) and Grossman and Maggi (2000)) on the
importance of complementarities for productivity patterns.) We hence consider an
example in which all the machine varieties are essential in production. We show that
even in the extreme form of complementarity (O-ring), technological diversiﬁcation
may still take place via variable capacity utilization.




The services of individual machine varieties are produced as before, with skilled oper-
ators, xi = hi. We assume, however, that the failure of the machine does not render
it completely useless (otherwise log output would become minus inﬁnity), but, rather,
makes it more expensive to operate. In particular, while good machines require 1 unit
of skill labor, broken machines require δ > 1 units.
Let us ﬁrst focus on the case without variable capacity utilization, that is, when
the number of operators per machines is constant at h. This implies that when the
ﬁrst machine fails, output drops from h to h/δ. (Further failures have no impact on
output.) So the change in log output is
∆lnY = −lnδ.
Since the ﬁrst failures arrives after an exponentially distributed working time with an
arrival rate of γn, the instantaneous variance is
Var(dlnY )/dt = (lnδ)
2γn.
This is in fact increasing in n; the more complex the technology, the more likely a
machine failure is. We do not have an oﬀsetting eﬀect from the law of large numbers
because the working machines do not substitute for the broken one.
Consider now the case with variable capacity utilization. In this case, we let ﬁrms
reshuﬄe operators across machine varieties, only holding the total number of operators
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to partially oﬀset this negative productivity shock. With free reallocation of operators,
it is optimal to equalize the services of each machine variety at, say, x. This requires
δx operators on the broken machine and (n − 1)x operators on the rest. The total
number of operators is unchanged, so
δx + (n − 1)x = nh.
The change in log output is hence
∆lnY = lnn − ln(n − 1 + δ),
which is negative, that is, output still drops but it drops by less than without VCU.
The ﬁrm can successfully mitigate some of the impact of the shock with VCU.
The instantaneous variance in this case is
Var(dlnY )/dt = [lnn − ln(n − 1 + δ)]
2γn.
The ﬁrst part decreases with n. The more machine varieties there are, the more possi-
bilities there exist to reshuﬄe operators without aﬀecting output too much. The second
part is increasing in n because more complex technologies fail more often. In general
the eﬀect of technological complexity on volatility is hence ambiguous. Nonetheless, as
complexity increases without bound (n → ∞), the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates and volatility
goes to zero,
lim
n→∞Var(dlnY )/dt = 0.
To see this, use the intermediate value theorem to rewrite [lnn − ln(n − 1 + δ)] as
(δ −1)/[n+ξn(δ −1)], where ξn ∈ [0,1]. Since ξn is bounded, [lnn−ln(n−1+δ)]2 =
O(n−2) and γn = O(n) .
In summary, the ability to vary capacity utilization can make more complex tech-
nologies less volatile even in the case of fully complementary inputs.
B A two-sector model of technological diversiﬁcation
In 2.3, we presented the supply side of a multi-sector model. This section solves for the
general equilibrium in such a model. The demand for individual goods will only matter




Working Paper Series No. 551
November 2005Let us assume that there are two sectors, one producing a capital good Yk, the



















Both sectors use the same CES technology, but they have access to a diﬀerent set of
machines. In particular, the number of machines in the two sectors will (endogenously)
be diﬀerent. The owner of each machine will decide which sector to operate in. The
total number of machines nk + nc is denoted by n.
We assume that machines in the capital good sector are operated by skilled labor,
whereas those in the consumption good sector are operated by unskilled labor.19 Note
that machines are a metaphor for technology in our model so this amounts to assuming
that some technologies are skilled labor intensive, whereas others are unskilled labor
intensive. Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998) show that computerization has increased
the demand for skilled labor. However, previous technological advances such as the in-
dustrial revolution and the introduction of the production line relied more on unskilled
rather than skilled workers (James and Skinner 1985, Goldin and Katz 1998). In this
paper, we think of the skilled-labor intensive sector as a technologically advanced sec-






hit, if i ≤ nk, Ki0 = κ and t < Ti;
lit, if nk < i ≤ n, Ki0 = κ and t < Ti;
0, otherwise.
(27)
Here hit denotes the number of skilled operators and lit the number of unskilled oper-
ators of variety i, and κ and Ti are deﬁned, as previously, as the ﬁxed cost of building
a machine and the random lifetime of machine i.
Let H denote the overall stock of skilled labor in the economy and L the stock of
unskilled labor. If the labor markets are in equilibrium, the production functions can
19Any positive diﬀerence in skill intensity is suﬃcient for our results; we assume this extreme
diﬀerence in skill intensity for tractability.
20In Section 3 we discuss how we identify technological complexity in the data.
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Similarly to the one-sector case, the productivity of a ﬁrm in sector i will be increasing
in the number of machines. This also causes the volatility of productivity to decline
with the number of machines:
Volk = Var(dlnYk|nk,H) = φ
2γ/nk, (28)
Volc = Var(dlnYc|nc,L) = φ
2γ/nc. (29)
Both sectors are perfectly competitive. Each producer takes the wage rate and the set
of machine varieties available to the sector as given.
What determines the allocation of machines across the two sectors? Again, investors
will maximize proﬁts and move toward sectors with better proﬁt opportunities. The
price of machine service i will be marked up over the skilled wage in the capital good
sector and over the unskilled wage in the unskilled sector:
χi =
(
wH/σ, if i ≤ nk;
wL/σ, if nk < i ≤ n,
where wH denotes skilled, wL denotes unskilled wages. This makes proﬁt per machine
a constant φ fraction of wages per machine:
πi =
(
φwHH/nk, if i ≤ nk;
φwLL/nc, if nk < i ≤ n.
In long-run equilibrium, the rate of return on machines in the two sectors have to be
equal. Since the values of a machine are the same in each sector, so is the dividend







with ω = wH/wL denoting the skill premium.
The number of machines in a sector is proportional to the total wage bill of the
sector. Whenever (30) fails to hold, that is, one of the sectors has relatively few
machines, that sector has more proﬁts per machine than the other one. Investors will
then move machines across sectors (if machines are movable), or invest only in the
more proﬁtable sector until the equality is resolved.
38
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 551
November 2005We assume that machines are freely and instantly movable across sectors. This
assumption ensures that rk = rc at any time in any state of the world, implying that
(30) holds at any point in time.21 Since (30) would always hold in the long run, we only
need this assumption to simplify the transitional dynamics: If machines can instantly
adjust across sectors then the economy will immediately jump to its balanced-growth
path. Because the machines are movable across sectors, the single state variable is the
total number of machines, n.
Equation (30) describes a version of directed technical change, as in Acemoglu (2002)
or Caselli and Coleman (2000): Machine varieties are directed towards the sector with
a higher share in employment. On the one hand, this is a size eﬀect: if there are many
operators in a sector, it is more proﬁtable to operate machines there and hence more
machines will move towards this sector. On the other hand, there is also a relative
price eﬀect: If the skill premium is high, the relative price of the capital good is high,
so proﬁts are higher in the capital good sector.
Since the ﬁnal good sectors are competitive, the relative price of the capital good







If there are more machines allocated to the capital sector, it becomes more productive,
and its relative price falls.
B.1 The closed economy
In a closed economy, the relative price is determined by the relative supply and demand






where A is a constant and ε is the elasticity of substitution between capital and con-
















21Formally, the present discount value of a machine is pkκ in both sectors. If the dividend yield
in one sector is higher than in another, an investor could buy one unit of high-dividend stock and
short one unit of low-dividend stock. Since the prices of the two stocks always move in parallel, this
strategy presents an arbitrage opportunity with positive net dividends in all future periods and no
price risk. Absence of arbitrage hence implies the equalization of dividend yields.
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As we will show, the nominal saving rate in the economy is constant, which means
that pkYk/Yc is constant. This implies that the relative demand for the consumption









Since we have assumed 0 < φ < 1, the relative number of machines is increasing in the
relative amount of skilled labor in the economy. However, a 1 percent increase in skill
abundance induces a less than 1 percent increase in the relative number of machines in
the capital good sector. This is because the abundant factor (more precisely, the good
that uses the abundant factor intensively) becomes cheaper and hence less proﬁtable for
machine owners. This relative price eﬀect has been pointed out by Acemoglu (2002).
The ﬁxed cost required to build a machine is assumed to arise in capital goods.
In terms of consumption goods, the ﬁxed cost is pkκ. The mean rate of return on




− γ = φ
wHH/nk
pkκ






where we have made use of the facts that capital good prices equal marginal costs
(wHn
−φ
k ) and that the sunk cost is falling at the rate φ − 1, κ = κ0Lnφ−1. Relative
to (19), the important diﬀerence is that the rate of return is falling in the relative
complexity of the capital good sector. The number of machines aﬀects proﬁtability in
two ways. First, more machines make the capital sector more productive and hence
more proﬁtable (productivity is proportional to n
φ
k). Second, competition increases in
the number of machines, because machines compete for a scarce supply of operators
(H). This second eﬀect lowers proﬁts proportionally with n, so it dominates the ﬁrst
for φ < 1.
The relative demand for capital and consumption goods will be determined by
the consumption-saving decision. Since the mutual fund holds all machines in both
sectors, the Euler equation of the consumer is the same as in (22), but the growth rate
of machines and the return on machines may be diﬀerent.
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The Euler equation simpliﬁes to µn = r − ρ. Substituting from (35) and (36), we see

















Since φ ∈ (0,1), the left-hand side of (39) is monotonically declining, the right-hand
side is monotonically increasing in v0. At v0 = 0 the left-hand side H/(κ0L), the right-
hand side is φH/(κ0L) − ρ < H/(κ0L). At v0 = L, the left-hand side is zero, whereas
the right-hand side tends to inﬁnity. That is, there exists a unique v0 ∈ (0,L) such
that (39) holds.
Note that v0 does not depend on n, implying that the allocation of machines across
sectors as well as the relative prices are independent of development. In other words,
the economy exhibits balanced growth. This also means that the saving rate is constant
as previously claimed.
B.2 A small open economy
If the economy is open to trade then the relative price of the two goods is determined
in world markets. Let ˜ pk denote the world price of capital. We then have from (31)






which results in conditional factor price equalization,






Conditional on the levels of productivity in the two sectors, the world relative price of
the two goods completely determines the relative wage. All else equal, a higher relative
price of the capital good (high ˜ pk) leads to a higher relative wage of the factor which
is used intensively in that sector (high ω). This is the FPE part. At the same time,
the more productive the capital good sector is relative to the consumption good sector,
the higher the relative wage of skilled labor.
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tion structure is independent of demand considerations. Relative demand for the two
sectors (in our case, the consumption/investment decision) will matter only for the











Notice that, similarly to the closed economy case, (34), the relative number of machines
in the capital sector increases in skill abundance. However, the dependence on skill
abundance is stronger, 1/(1−φ), because we no longer have an oﬀsetting relative price
eﬀect. This is just the Rybczynski theorem applied to directed technical change.
The impact is also greater than in the case of pure factor price equalization. The
reason for this is that machines ﬂow towards the sector that already has a comparative
advantage, making it relatively more productive. This becomes an additional source
of comparative advantage. In other words, the initial comparative advantage gets
magniﬁed by directed technical change. Our model says that even small human capital
diﬀerences can account for large diﬀerences in specialization patterns and, hence, in
the relative volatilities of sectors.
C Data Appendix
Variable Deﬁnitions
GDP per capita GDP per capita of the country in 1997, measured in 1995 interna-
tional dollars. [WDI, PWT]
Population Population of the country in 1997. [WDI]
Yield volatility Variance of the log of annual wheat yield. [FAOSTAT]
Rainfall volatility Variance of cumulated log changes in precipitation. Precipitation
data are recorded monthly at several meteorological stations within a country.
Because many stations do not report data in all months, we take the average
of year-on-year changes for all months and all stations within the country. We
cumulate these changes to obtain the country’s deviation from long-run precipi-
tation trends. [Global Historical Climatology Network]
Temperature volatility Variance of cumulated changes in temperature, calculated
in the same way as rainfall volatility. [Global Historical Climatology Network]
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November 2005Diverse powerplants dummy Takes the value of one if the concentration of pow-
erplants by type (conventional, hydroelectric, nuclear, renewable) in the country
is below the median. [International Energy Annual]
Technological Diversiﬁcation The log of the inverse of the Herﬁndahl index of con-
centration of equipment purchases across diﬀerent varieties of capital goods. A
sector has a high Technological Diversiﬁcation index if it purchased many diﬀer-
ent capital goods. [1997 Capital Flow Tables]
Average Share in Manufacturing The sector’s share in manufacturing employment,
averaged across the sample period, 1963–1998. [UNIDO]
Labor Productivity Value added per worker in 1995 dollars, averaged across the
sample period, 1963–1998. [UNIDO]
Variance of Productivity The variance of 5-year growth of value added per worker
in 1995 dollars across the sample period, 1963–1998. [UNIDO]
Skill Intensity The fraction of production workers in the 3-digit ISIC sector that
are employed in skilled or semi-skilled occupations. [Occupational Employment
Statistics]
Share of Materials The share of intermediate inputs in total sales. [NBER-CES
Manufacturing Industry Database]
Equipment per Worker, Structure per Worker [NBER-CES Manufacturing In-
dustry Database]
Revealed Comparative Advantage The share of sector s in country i’s manufac-
turing export relative to the world average. [Trade and Production Database]
Data References
(1) Bartelsman, E. J., Becker, R. A., and Gray, W. B., NBER-CES Manufacturing
Industry Database. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2000.
(2) Beck, T. Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt, A. and Levine, R., Financial Structure and Economic
Development Database. World Bank, 2001.
(3) Botero, J., Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Schleifer, A. and Lopez-de-Silanes, F., The
Regulation of Labor. 2004.
(4) Capital Flows in the U.S. Economy 1997. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2003.
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November 2005Table 1. Yield Volatility and Development             
   Variance of wheat yield    






      




      
Temperature volatility         – 0.2413 
(0.1480) 
       Rainfall volatility 
      
0.0319 
(0.1159) 
Observations 20   20   20   
Adjusted R–squared  0.3524    0.329    0.377    
           
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5, 1%. All 
variables are in logs. Dependent variable is the variance of log wheat yield per acre. (Source: 
FAOSTAT, Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN.) Temperature volatility is the 
variance of annual temperature changes. Rainfall volatility is the variance of percentage annual 
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Share of oil in 
energy 




Change in oil price ×          









Observations 4169  4164 
Country Fixed Effects  217  217 
Adjusted R–squared  0.089  0.017 
        
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 
5, 1%. Dependent variables are (1) the log change in electricity production in 
kWh, (2) the %point change in the share of oil consumption in total energy 
consumption (in British thermal units). Oil price change is the 2– year change in 
U.S. CPI– deflated price of West Texas Intermediate oil. The concentration of 
power plants is measured as the Herfindahl index of shares of power generation 
techniques (conventional, nuclear, hydroelectric, renewable) in total electricity 
production of the country. Countries with “diverse power plant types” are those 
with below-median concentration. (Source: International Energy Annual 2002, 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































– 0.2952***  – 0.3259***  GDP per capita  
(1995 international dollars, log)  (0.0699) (0.0655) 
 –  0.1353***  Population (log)   (0.0376) 
– 3.6316***  – 1.2573  Constant 
(0.5968) (0.8663) 
Observations 167  167 
Adjusted R–squared  0.10  0.15 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant 
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Table 5. List of Sectors. Technological Diversification Index and Average Share in 
Manufacturing 
ISIC 




Average Share in 
Manufacturing 
311 Food  products  2.898  0.1581 
313 Beverages  2.975  0.0282 
314 Tobacco  2.666 0.0148 
321 Textiles  1.733  0.1210 
322  Wearing apparel, except footwear  2.303  0.0818 
323 Leather  products  3.278  0.0089 
331  Wood products, except furniture  2.368  0.0345 
332  Furniture, except metal  2.909  0.0223 
341  Paper and products  2.433  0.0242 
342 Printing  and  publishing  2.340  0.0371 
351 Industrial  chemicals  2.835  0.0235 
352 Other  chemicals  2.808  0.0342 
353 Petroleum  refineries  2.726  0.0099 
354  Miscellaneous petroleum and coal products  2.726  0.0023 
355 Rubber  products  2.217  0.0167 
356 Plastic  products  1.847  0.0251 
361 Pottery,  china,  earthenware  3.006  0.0065 
362  Glass and products  3.006  0.0093 
369  Other non– metallic mineral products  3.006  0.0438 
371 Iron  and  steel  2.618  0.0297 
372 Non–  ferrous  metals  3.111  0.0117 
381  Fabricated metal products  2.849  0.0589 
382  Machinery, except electrical 2.817  0.0662 
383 Machinery,  electric  2.487  0.0637 
384 Transport  equipment  2.722  0.0548 
385  Professional and scientific equipment  2.999  0.0116 
      
Notes: Sectors correspond to the 3-digit manufacturing sectors from Revision 2 of the International Standard 
Industrial Classification of all Economic Activities (ISIC). Technological diversification measures the diversity of 
capital goods a sector purchases in the U.S. Average share is the sector’s share in manufacturing employment 
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Table 6. Productivity, Volatility and Development 
   Log 
Productivity 
Log        
Variance 
0.7047*** –  0.3005*** GDP per capita (log) 
(0.0690) (0.1020) 
Sector Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
Observations 1429  1429 
Adjusted R–squared 0.73  0.14 
Notes: The regressions use sectoral data at the 3– digit level and include 
sector–specific effects. Mean labor productivity and variance of labor 
productivity growth rates correspond to the period 1963– 1998. Robust 
standard errors are adjusted for country clustering. * Significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
 
 
Table 7. Productivity, Volatility and Technological Diversification 




0.0660*** –  0.0999**  Technological Diversification 
(0.0234) (0.0448) 
0.2351*** –  0.3005***  Sectoral Skill Intensity (log) 
(0.0441) (0.0919) 
0.2155*** 0.0289  Share of Materials in 
Production (log)  (0.0634) 0.0939 
0.4613*** 0.0062  Equipment per Worker (log) 
(0.0184) 0.0211 
– 0.0532***  – 0.1727***  Labor Share (Log) 
(0.0151) (0.0240) 
Country Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
Observations 1535  1535 
Adjusted R–squared 0.81  0.56 
 
Notes: The equations use sectoral data at the 3– digit level and include country– 
specific effects. Mean labor productivity and variance of labor productivity growth 
rates correspond to the period 1963– 1998. Technological diversification measures the 
diversity of capital goods a sector purchases in the U.S. Skill intensity is the share of 
skilled and semi-skilled workers. Material share is the ratio of material costs to total 
shipments. Labor share is the sector’s share in manufacturing employment. (See Data 
Appendix.) Robust standard errors are adjusted for country clustering. * Significant at 
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Table 8a. Sectoral Shares, Technological Diversification, and Development 




0.0083* 0.0089**  Technological Diversification  × 
Real GDP per capita (Log)  (0.0044) (0.0044) 
– 0.1015**  – 0.1075*** 
Technological Diversification  
(0.0404) (0.0408) 
– 0.0248**    Real GDP per capita (Log) 
(0.0115)    
Country Fixed Effects  No  Yes 
Observations 1429  1429 
Adjusted R–squared 0.05  0.12 
 
Notes: The equations use sectoral data at the 3– digit level. The dependent variable is the share of the 
sector in total manufacturing employment, averaged over 1963–1998. The second column includes 
country– specific effects. Technological diversification measures the diversity of capital goods a sector 
purchases in the U.S. (See Data Appendix.) Robust standard errors clustered by country are shown in 
parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
 
Table 8b. Sectoral Shares, Volatility, and Development 
   Sectoral Share  Sectoral Share 
– 0.0006***  – 0.0015***  Sectoral Variance ×  
Real GDP per capita (Log)  (0.0002) (0.0004) 
– 0.0075  – 0.0018  Sectoral Variance  
(0.0061) (0.0060) 
– 0.0064***    Real GDP per capita (Log) 
(0.0014)    
Country Fixed Effects  No  Yes 
Observations 1429  1429 
Adjusted R–squared 0.04  0.10 
Notes: The equations use sectoral data at the 3– digit level. The dependent variable is the 
share of the sector in total manufacturing employment, averaged over 1963–1998. The 
second column includes country– specific effects. Variance of labor productivity growth 
rates correspond to the period 1963– 1998. Robust standard errors clustered by country 
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Table 9. Relative Size and Volatility 
   Log        
Variance 
Log        
Variance 
Log        
Variance 
– 0.1554*** – 0.1743*** – 0.1893***  Labor Share 
(0.0256) (0.0233)  (0.0293) 
Country Fixed Effects  No Yes  Yes 
Sector Fixed Effects  No No  Yes 
Observations 1521  1521  1521 
Adjusted R–squared 0.03  0.55  0.59 
Notes: The equations use sectoral data at the 3– digit level. Labor share is the sector’s share in total 
manufacturing employment, averaged over 1963–1998.  Robust standard errors are adjusted for country 
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Table 10. Other Institutions Reducing Volatility 
   Log Variance 




















Sector Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  1607 1607 1319 1319 
Adjusted R–squared  0.11  0.12 0.16 0.17 
Notes: Robust standard errors (in parentheses) allow for clustering within countries. * Significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Complex sectors are those with above median 
investment good diversification. Labor market rigidities are measured by an index that combines the 
costs of firing workers and changing employment terms (Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Schleifer and 
Lopez–de–Silanes, 2004). 
 
Table 11. Output versus Input Diversification   
   Log Variance      
(all sectors) 
Log Variance   
(complex sectors) 
–0.1140*** –0.1357***  Number of firms (log) 
(0.0382) (0.0487) 
–0.1550*** –0.1887***  Average size of firms (log) 
(0.0516) (0.0603) 
Country Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
Sector Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
Observations 1586  932 
Adjusted R–squared 0.48  0.43 
Notes: Robust standard errors (in parentheses) allow for clustering within countries. * 
Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Complex sectors are those with 
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